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advantages of a universal monarchy, acting as a judge above the sovereign
states, who in turn are balanced against each other in the institution-
alised federative system. On this basis, Penn believed, trust among states
would be possible. This would in turn advance the ‘Peace and Prosperity
of Europe’.201 Pious words, but Penn apparently did not doubt that there
was a realistic chance for trust and ultimately for peace on the basis of his
proposal.
4.3 The Abbe´ De Saint-Pierre’s (1658–1743) Project for Peace
and his Challenge to Early Modern Statecraft
In contrast to the previous wars waged by Louis XIV, the War of the
Spanish Succession202 was not started by him. It ensued because of conflicts
endogenous to the European state system. The European powers had long
anticipated this conflict over the Spanish inheritance since they all had
vested interests in how to divide the enormous territories of the Spanish
monarchy. France and the AustrianHabsburgs seemed to have equally valid
dynastic claims to succeed to the Spanish throne. The Protestant maritime
powers – England and the Dutch Republic – could not allow the huge
Spanish overseas dominion to fall solely to the French. But all plans, secret
agreements of partition and attempts to sort out these conflicting European
interests on the basis of dynastic politics failed. Not long before his death,
Charles II had declared in his will that Philippe of Anjou, grandson of
Louis XIV, should become heir to the Spanish crown.203 In the winter of
1700 French diplomacy was prepared to take the risk of driving the sea
powers into the arms of the Austrian Habsburgs. When Charles II died on
1November 1700, Louis XIV declared on the sixteenth of the same month
in the name of his grandson that France was willing to accept Charles II’s
testament.204 He knew that this move would provoke the other European
powers and he consequently prepared to secure the execution of Charles
II’s will by force. The Bavarian prince elector Max Emanuel and the prince
elector of Cologne were the only allies on the French side.
201 Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 419.
202 Still valuable is J. W. Gerard, The Peace of Utrecht. A Historical Review of the Great Treaty of
1713–14, and of the Principal Events of the War of the Spanish Succession (New York, London 1885).
203 The authoritative account in English is still J. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469–1716 (London 1970),
see in particular p. 370–386. See also H. Kamen, Spain’s Road to Empire. The Making of a World
Power 1492–1763 (London 2002), p. 439–453.
204 See now J. M. de Bernardo Ares, Luis XIV Rey de Espanˇa. De los Imperios plurinacionales a los
Estados unitarios (1665–1714) (Madrid 2008), p. 176–181.
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France thus faced a formidable coalition of European forces, formed as
the great alliance of The Hague in September 1701 and led by William
III and Leopold I.205 With Prince Eugen and John Churchill, Duke of
Marlborough, the military campaign of this coalition was led by two
remarkable generals. When William III died on 8 March 1702, Louis XIV
recognised the son of the former King James II who had died in 1701
in French exile, as James III King of England. This was perceived as an
additional threat to England, especially as it threatened to re-catholicise
the English crown, and it helped to further cement the coalition between
the Austrian Habsburgs and England.
As we have already seen with Penn’s plan for a European peace from 1693
and Fletcher’s Discours concerning the Affairs of Spain from 1698, French
aggression and the pending question of the Spanish succession attracted
the attention of European political thinkers. The Projet pour rendre la
Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe by the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre (1658–1743) and
a minor text with an apparently similar proposal by John Bellers (1654–
1725), entitled Some Reasons for an European State, proposed to the Powers of
Europe, were written towards the end of the war of the Spanish succession
and can be seen as closely related to the concerns already raised by Penn
and Fletcher. Like Penn, they followed in the tradition of earlier works206
and both explicitly reference Henry IV’s Grand Design.207
205 With hindsight Boutant, L’Europe au grand tournant des anne´es 1680, claimed p. 899: ‘La chance des
Franc¸ais a, peut-eˆtre, e´te´ que Louis XIV ait eu des adversaires a` son format: le roi d’Angleterre, Guil-
laume III, prince d’Orange, l’Empereur Le´opold. Les empoignades franco-allemandes auxquelles
ont donne´ lieu les guerres de la fin du re`gne, ont eu pour re´sultat la fixation de frontie`res acceptables
pour la France et qui ont e´te´ reconnues par ses voisins’.
206 When considering the various influences on the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, M. L. Perkins, The Moral
and Political Philosophy of the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre (Geneva, Paris 1959), p. 46f. is apparently not
aware that the Abbe´ must have known Cruce´’s Nouveau Cyne´e. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of
Peace, p. 33 also made the same point and claimed that the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre had not ‘heard of
Cruce´’. That this is, however, not the case can be confirmed by looking at the above-mentioned
correspondence between Leibniz and the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre in which they refer to Cruce´’s
work. As a matter of fact, Cruce´’s views on the federative structure of a European union as well
as, for instance, on trade might well have informed the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre’s proposal. Penn’s
influence on the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre has only recently been established. J. Drouet, L’abbe´ de
Saint-Pierre, l’homme et l’œuvre (Paris 1912), p. 122 had not fully grasped Penn’s importance. But
see now in particular Goyard-Fabre, La Construction de la paix, p. 100, van den Dungen, “The
Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre and the English ‘Irenists’ of the 18th Century (Penn, Bellers, and Bentham)”,
p. 10 and most importantly D. Sabbagh, “William Penn et l’abbe´ de Saint-Pierre: Le Chaıˆnon
manquant” in Revue de Synthe`se 4 (1997), p. 83–105.
207 Bellers stated in his long, cumbersome title his indebtedness to the Grand Design. The full title
is J. Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State: Proposed to the Powers of Europe, by an Universal
Guarantee, and an Annual Congress, Senate, Dyet, Or Parliament, to Settle Any Disputes about the
Bounds and Rights of Princes and States Hereafter. With an Abstract of a Scheme Form’d by King
Henry the Fourth of France, Upon the Same Subject. And Also, a Proposal for a General Council Or
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Like his friend Penn, Bellers was a Quaker.208 Unlike Penn’s and the
Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre’s writings, though, his short pamphlet does not
engage with a systematic evaluation of the inherent problems of a fed-
erative constitution for Europe. He claims that the English union with
Scotland shows that Europe could achieve the same and that Queen Anne
should ‘use Her endeavours for Uniting the Powers of Europe in one peace-
able Settlement’.209 Although he advocated that an ‘original contract’210
between the European states should be signed in order to establish a fed-
eral jurisdiction and arbitration, his argument seems initially to lack the
conviction and persuasive force of both Penn and the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre.
Bellers tried to influence the formulation of the war aims of the allied
powers ranged against France. His appeal to interest and utility is mixed
with ethical and moral claims but, similarly to Penn and later Saint-Pierre,
his proposal was ‘that at the next General Peace, there should be settled an
Universal Guarantee, an Annual Congress, Senate, Dyet, or Parlament, by
all the Princes and States of Europe, as well Enemies, as Neuters, joyned as
one State, with the renouncing of all Claims upon each other, with such
Articles of Agreement as may be needful for a Standing European Law’.211
However, Bellers’ main and – compared with the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre –
more audacious contribution was on religious politics. As the full title of
his work suggested, he proposed a ‘General Council Or Convocation of All
the Different Religious Perswasions in Christendom, (not to Dispute what
They Differ About, But) to Settle the General Principles They Agree In: By
which it Will Appear, that They May be Good Subjects and Neighbours,
Convocation of All the Different Religious Perswasions in Christendom, (not to Dispute what They
Differ About, But) to Settle the General Principles They Agree In: By which it Will Appear, that They
May be Good Subjects and Neighbours, Tho’ of Different Apprehensions of the Way to Heaven. In
Order to Prevent Broils and War at Home, when Foreign Wars are Ended (London 1710). In a later
edition the Abbe´ changed the title of his Projet and also explicitly referred to Henry IV’s Grand
Design. Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet de Traite´ pour rendre la paix perpe´tuelle entre les Souverains
chre´tiens, pour maintenir toujours le commerce libre entre les nations, pour affirmer beaucoup davantage
les maisons souveraines sur le troˆne. Propose´ autrefois par Henry le Grand, roi de France, agre´e´ par
la reine Elisabeth, par Jaques Ier, roi d’Angleterre, son successeur et la plupart des autres potentats
d’Europe (Utrecht 1717). At the end of this chapter the significance of the change of the title will
be discussed.
208 There are only few studies dedicated to Bellers. See in particular van den Dungen, “The Abbe´
de Saint-Pierre and the English ‘Irenists’” and some scattered comments in Goyard-Fabre, La
Construction de la paix, p. 103–105. Ter Meulen, Der Gedanke der Internationalen also has a short
chapter on Bellers. However, he is mistaken to claim p. 177 that Bellers’s pamphlet had been
published anonymously. Although his name is not mentioned on the title page, it appears three
times on p. II, VI and 20.
209 Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. II.
210 Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. II.
211 Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. 4.
Saint-Pierre’s Project for Peace and his Challenge 179
Tho’ of Different Apprehensions of the Way to Heaven’.212 The Quakers’
various proposals for reform were motivated by religious concerns. Penn
and Bellers both proposed multiple ways to reform society and their plans
for European peace have to be seen in this wider context.213 Bellers insisted
that it was because of ‘the pretence of ( . . . ) Religion, [that] it’s [sic]
Professors shall have the hottest Animosities and hatred, there having been
far more Christian Blood spilt, by one another, than ever was spilt, by
the greatest of their Heathen Prosecutors’.214 What is thus essential for
achieving reliable peace in Europe is, according to Bellers, not only a
federative structure as already proposed by Penn, but the end of religious
persecution and ‘a New sort of General Council of all the several Christian
Perswasions in Europe’.215
Bellers had been prosecuted and imprisoned several times before the
English Parliament passed the Toleration Act in 1689. And he had seen the
persecutions in France after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. As a
matter of fact, he had helped Huguenots to flee France and settle in the
New World, in Pennsylvania.216 There can, therefore, be no doubt that
Bellers and Penn worked very closely together on their projects. They were
both motivated by religious convictions. At the heart of Bellers’ proposal
for European peace lies a deep concern for religious toleration and a quest
to find common ground among the different Christian confessions. Only
in this way would it be possible ‘to put an end to all Wars and Bloodshed
for Religion’.217
Bellers’ short work may only have had limited influence on the political
debates about the reorganisation of the European state system, but his
concern for a religious settlement signals an element missing in the Abbe´’s
plan for peace. When the first English translation of the Abbe´ de Saint-
Pierre’s Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe appeared in 1714,
Bellers commented: ‘The many Advantages of an European State and
Senate, are excellently well discoursed of, by the Abbot St. Pierre, of the
French Academy, lately published in English. ( . . . ) But he saith little about
212 Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State.
213 TerMeulen,Der Gedanke der Internationalen, p. 171: ‘Die Friedensbestrebungen der Qua¨ker stehen
mit ihren anderen humanita¨ren und sozialen Forderungen in engemZusammenhang. Alle erkla¨ren
sich aus ihrer religio¨sen U¨berzeugung’. See also J. Bellers, An Essay Towards the Improvement of
Physick in twelve Proposals by which the Lives of many Thousands of the Rich, as well as of the Poor
may be saved yearly (London 1714).
214 Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. 10f.
215 Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. 14.
216 Cf. van den Dungen, “The Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre and the English ‘Irenists’”, p. 13.
217 Bellers, Some Reasons for an European State, p. 14.
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a peaceable settling of the Religious Disputes, tho’ they have been some
of the greatest occasions of War in Christendom, and until Persecutions
and Violences about Religion are prevented or stopt, they will so long
make all Arguments for a General Peace ineffectual, however valuable and
demonstrable those Reasons may be’.218 However, ‘Bellers quickly became
a forgotten figure, and when he was re-discovered almost a century after
his death, it was not his peace plan but his schemes for economic reform
which excited interest’.219
In fact the Abbe´’s own plan for peace220 was for a long time considered
an eccentric and utterly unrealistic idea. Voltaire’s acid criticism exemplifies
this negative view. Under the telling pseudonym of Dr Goodheart, Voltaire
published his De la Paix perpe´tuelle in 1769. The second half of the first
sentence of this work was targeted at the Abbe´: ‘The peace imagined by
a Frenchman named Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre is a chimera which will never
survive between princes anymore than between elephants and rhinoceroses,
between wolves and dogs. Carnivorous animals always tear each other apart
at the first opportunity’.221 Accordingly, Kant remarked that the peace
project of the ‘Abbe´ St. Pierre ( . . . ) has always been ridiculed by great
statesmen, and still more by heads of state, as an academic and childish
idea emerging from the schools’.222
This situation has not much improved in recent scholarship. Notwith-
standing some important studies223, the significance of the Abbe´ de
Saint-Pierre as a political thinker has long been ignored. In many ways
this has to do with what appears to be no more than a minor biographical
detail that stubbornly remains misleading in wide parts of the relevant
literature. Even in fairly recent studies on the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, or in
general accounts of the history of international relations, we find the myth
218 Bellers, An Essay Towards the Improvement of Physick, p. 47.
219 van den Dungen, “The Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre and the English ‘Irenists’”, p. 15.
220 This text is now easily accessible in a reprint: Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix
perpe´tuelle en Europe [Utrecht 1713], ed. by S. Goyard-Fabre (Paris 1981).
221 Voltaire, “De la Paix perpe´tuelle” in Oeuvres comple`tes vol. 23 (Paris 1828), p. 25: ‘La paix imagine´e
par un Franc¸ais, nomme´ l’abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, est une chime`re qui ne subsistera pas plus entre les
princes qu’entre les e´le´phans et les rhinoce´ros, entre les loups et les chiens. Les animaux carnassiers
se de´chireront toujours a` la premie`re occasion’.
222 I. Kant, “On the common saying: That might be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice”
in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Practical Philosophy, ed. by M. J. Gregor
(Cambridge 1996), p. 309.
223 The first seem to be G. de Molinari, L’abbe´ de Saint-Pierre. Membre exclu de l’Acade´mie franc¸aise.
Sa vie et ses œuvres (Paris 1857) and two years later E. Goumy, Étude sur la vie et les e´crits de l’Abbe´
de Saint-Pierre (Paris 1859), compare also: Drouet, L’abbe´ de Saint-Pierre and H. H. Post, La socie´te´
des nations de l’Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre (Amsterdam 1932).
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reiterated that the Abbe´ attended the negotiations at Utrecht as secretary
to the French envoy Abbe´ de Polignac and that as a result of this experience
he wrote his Projet.224 Nothing is further from the truth. It is difficult to see
how such a misconception survives, given that Herbert G. Folkes already
settled this matter convincingly in 1966.225 But for many scholars this
misconception determined their negative verdict on the political thought
of the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, as if he only wrote in favour of his king,
Louis XIV, to help negotiate a favourable peace at Utrecht for the French
crown.
In fact the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre simply could not have travelled to
Utrecht together with the Abbe´ de Polignac, who left Paris for Utrecht
on 7 January 1712, because ‘on this very day ( . . . ) the Abbe´ de Saint
Pierre signed the attendance register of the French Academy and he kept
signing it three times a week during this whole year. He missed just one
of the hundred and fifty sessions, on the fourteenth of November’.226
Additional circumstantial evidence points to the same conclusion. The
letters of accreditation and passports for the envoys to the congress do
not show the name of Saint-Pierre, nor does the Abbe´ himself talk in his
Annales politiques as though he had been at the congress in Utrecht.227 The
assertion – made without any endeavour to provide the slightest proof –
that the Abbe´ ‘was present at the Congress of Utrecht, which gave him the
idea of writing the Project’ is simply not substantiated.228
224 See only two recent examples which make similar unsubstantiated claims about Saint-Pierre’s
presence at the congress at Utrecht: F. Speltore, “Federalism in the History of Thought. Abbe´
de Saint-Pierre” in The Federalist. A Political Review 36 (1994), p. 221–235 and H. Kleinschmidt,
Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen (Stuttgart 1998), p. 157.
225 H. G. Folkes, “L’Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre assista-t-il au congre`s d’Utrecht?” in Revue d’Histoire
Litte´raire de la France 66 (1966), p. 483–487.
226 Folkes, “L’Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre”, p. 486: ‘ce jour meˆme ( . . . ) l’abbe´ de Saint-Pierre signa le registre
de pre´sence de l’Acade´mie franc¸aise, et il continua a` la signer trois fois par semaine pendant toute
cette anne´e, ne manquant qu’a` une seule des cent cinquante se´ances – celle du 14 novembre’.
227 Folkes, “L’Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre”, p. 485. See also Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the
Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre and Post, La Socie´te´ des Nations.
228 Speltore, “Federalism in the History of Thought”, p. 221. Unfortunately, even Franc¸ois Bluche
reiterates the same error in his Dictionnaire du Grand Sie`cle when he states (F. Bluche, “Saint-
Pierre” in Dictionnaire du Grand Sie`cle, ed. by F. Bluche (Paris 1990), p. 1396): ‘En 1712, quand la
paix commence de se ne´gocier se´rieusement a` Utrecht, le mare´chal d’Huxelles et le futur cardinal
de Polignac ( . . . ) s’appre`tent a` gagner les Provinces-Unies en qualite´ de ple´nipotentaires. L’abbe´
de Saint-Pierre les accompagne, comme secre´taire de l’abbe´ de Polignac’. It is more than regrettable
that this myth even found its way into such a prestigious work of reference, as it also did into Sven
Stelling-Michaud’s prominent introduction to Rousseau’s writings on the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre.
(See S. Stelling-Michaud, “E´crits sur l’Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre” in J.-J. Rousseau, Œuvres comple`tes
vol. III (Paris 1964), p. CXLI). That this error is repeated in such prominent places may well be
the reason that the myth of the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre’s presence at the negotiations at Utrecht has
not died so easily.
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The Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre had started on his project well before 1712.
We know of at least four shorter prior versions written between 1708 and
1711.229 However, this does not mean that he was not keen to present the
final version to exert influence on the preliminary peace negotiations and
the outcome of the settlement: ‘It does not seem complicated to me to
improve this project’, he wrote ‘( . . . ) but several people who know about
public affairs and who have carefully read the book assured me that as it
is, if it were printed in several languages and spread in the most important
cities of Europe, it could give useful insights to the principal ministers and
to those who will be involved in future peace negotiations and thus make
the peace easier to achieve and more lasting’.230 The Abbe´ made a similar
claim in the preface to his Projet: ‘It is easy to understand that the more this
project contains methods to make peace unalterable in Europe, the more
it will be able to help facilitate the conclusion of the one we are currently
treating at Utrecht’.231
The Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre’s principal writings are still unavailable in
English, and he is largely neglected in anglophone research on international
political thought.232 Knowledge of the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre in early mod-
ern Britain seems to have been channelled mainly by Rousseau’s A Project
for Perpetual Peace. By J. J. Rousseau [or rather, abridged by him from the
“Projet de paix perpe´tuelle” of the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre] . . . Translated from
229 See O. Asbach, “Die Reichsverfassung als fo¨derativer Staatenbund. Das Alte Reich in der politis-
chen Philosophie des Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre and Jean-Jacques Rousseau” in Altes Reich, Frankreich
und Europa. Politische, philosophische und historische Aspekte des franzo¨sischen Deutschlandbildes im
17. und 18. Jahrhundert, ed. by O. Asbach et al. (Berlin 2001), p. 179f.
230 Archives duMiniste`re des Affaires e´trange`res (Paris),M.D. France 309, 2r f.: ‘Je voi sans paine combien
je pourrois encore perfectionner ce projet ( . . . ) mais plusieurs personnes qui ont connoisance des
affaires publiques ayant lu l’ouvrage avec attention m’ont assure´ que tel qu’il est, s’il etoit imprime´
en diverses langues et repandu dans les principales villes de l’Europe; il pouurait donner des vues
tres utiles aux ministres principaux et a` ceux qui seront employez dans les negociations de la paix
prochain pour la rendre plus facile et plus durable’.
231 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle, p. XVIIf.: ‘Il est aise´ de comprendre que
plus ce Projet refermera de moyens de rendre la Paix inalte´rable en Europe, plus il peut contribuer
a` faciliter la conclus de celle que l’on traite pre´sentement a` Utrecht’.
232 A notable exception is the still valuable study by Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of
the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre. His demonstration of Hobbes’s influence on the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre
is particularly important. See also T. E. Kaiser, “The Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Public Opinion, and
the Reconstitution of the French Monarchy” in Journal of Modern History 55 (1983), p. 618–643. I
have been unable to trace a complete English translation of the Abbe´’s Projet or any of his other
writings. See notably Selections from the second edition of the Abre´ge´ du Projet de Paix Perpe´tuelle
by C. I. Castel de Saint-Pierre, translated by H. Hale Bellot (London 1927) as well as Abbe´ de
Saint-Pierre, A Project for Settling an Everlasting Peace in Europe First Proposed by Henry IV of
France, and Approved of by Queen Elizabeth, and now discussed at large and made practicable by the
Abbot St. Pierre (London 1714).
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the French, with a preface by the translator (London 1761).233 Two centuries
later, Richard Tuck can still claim that ‘Saint Pierre ( . . . ) was (as Rousseau
pointed out) extremely naı¨ve about the process whereby the warring
states of Europe could unite’.234 If Rousseau does not provide an adequate
understanding of the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre’s proposal for perpetual peace,
the explanation lies in the fact that for Rousseau, but not for the Abbe´, the
Holy Roman Empire was crucial to guaranteeing the balance of power in
Europe.
Arguably the Abbe´ was sidelined because he challenged what appeared
to almost all contemporary diplomats and statesmen to be the most impor-
tant concept in the realm of international politics, that is to say, the balance
of power among European sovereigns and states. After the Peace of West-
phalia, the idea of a balance of power emerged as the highest wisdom of
European statecraft to safeguard interstate relations and the status quo.235
The Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre challenged the centrality of the balance of power,
233 There are quite a few studies dedicated to the relationship between Rousseau and Saint-Pierre,
see in particular: Stelling-Michaud, “E´crits sur l’Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre”, S. Stelling-Michaud, “Ce
que Jean-Jacques Rousseau doit a` l’Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre” in E´tudes sur le Contrat de Jean-Jacques
Rousseau. Actes des Journe´es d’e´tude a` Dijon pour la commemoration du 200e anniversaire du Contrat
social (Paris 1964), p. 35–45, J. L. Leclercle, “L’Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau et l’Europe” in
Dix-Huitie`me Sie´cle 25 (1993), p. 23–38, Goyard-Fabre, La Construction de la paix, p. 147–171 and
Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, p. 97–133. It is thanks to
the perceptive studies by Olaf Asbach that the importance of Saint-Pierre’s work, in particular as a
major contribution to the political theory of international relations, was recently highlighted and
put in a wider intellectual context. Apart from Asbach’s work mentioned earlier, see in particular
O. Asbach, “Zwischen Souvera¨nita¨t und Fo¨deration. Moderne Staatlichkeit und die Ordnung
Europas beim Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre und Jean-Jacques Rousseau” inZeitschrift fu¨r Politikwissenschaft
11 (2001), p. 1073–1099, O. Asbach and D. Hu¨ning, “Naturzustand und Rechtsbegru¨ndung. Der
Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre zwischen Hobbes und Rousseau” in Archiv fu¨r Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie
84 (1998), p. 307–325 and his masterful monograph O. Asbach, Die Za¨hmung der Leviathane.
Die Idee einer Rechtsordnung zwischen Staaten bei Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre und Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(Berlin 2002).
234 Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace, p. 141. For instance, C. Covell, The Law of Nations in Political
Thought. A Critical Survey from Vitoria to Kant (Houndmills 2009), p. 157–161, makes a similarly
misleading statement.More nuanced is Boucher, Political Theories of International Relations, p. 291.
The best English study on the relationship of Rousseau and the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre is still Perkins,
The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre. He states on p. 9: ‘Rousseau, who
as the Abbe´’s foremost interpreter has influenced the attitudes of many people, at times sacrificed
accuracy to the spirit of controversy and on certain issues distorted Saint-Pierre’s projects with
a heavy hand. He devoted most of his attention to the Abbe´’s specific reforms and omitted the
theoretic structure on which they rest’.
235 See L. Dehio, Gleichgewicht oder Hegemonie. Betrachtungen u¨ber ein Grundproblem der neueren
Staatengeschichte (1948), E. Luard, The Balance of Power. The System of International Relations
1648–1815 (London 1992), H. Fenske, “Gleichgewicht, Balance” in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe.
Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland vol. 2, ed. by O. Brunner, W.
Conze and R. Koselleck (Stuttgart 1975), p. 959–996, K. Repgen, “Der Westfa¨lische Frieden
und die Urspru¨nge des europa¨ischen Gleichgewichts” in Jahres- und Tagungsbericht der Go¨rres-
Gesellschaft 1985, p. 50–66.
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seeing it instead as the obstacle to a durable peace structure.236 He was well
aware that the doctrine of sovereignty was at the heart of the raison d’eˆtre
of the balance of power. But he had to confront this conception if he was
to provide an alternative. The constitution of the Holy Roman Empire
provided him with a historical example; moreover, it served as a means of
accommodating sovereignty in a wider framework, which in turn would
allow for reliable peace and stability.237
Facing the dilemma that the sovereigns of the European states jealously
guarded their prerogatives238, the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre reformulated the
problems already spelled out by Machiavelli and Hobbes in his attempt
to provide new answers. As argued in Chapter 3.3, Pufendorf addressed
this dilemma in a systematic analysis. His equation of the state of nature
with the relationship between states tackled the most troublesome aspect
of interstate relations, namely, how international law can be enforceable
and at the same time compatible with the sovereignty of each state.
The idea of a system of states allowed for a new conceptualisation of
this intractable problem. However, the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre was equally
critical of Grotius and Pufendorf, whose solutions rested in his view on
theories of natural law. Instead – and that is, prima facie, more than
surprising – he praised Hobbes as the most pertinent source of guidance:
‘Hobbes ( . . . ) has approached this more by using the good method
of demonstration, but, unable to address all principles, instead of real
236 As we have seen in the previous chapters, the Abbe´ was not the first to explicitly develop a project
for peace in Europe nor was he the first to elaborate a theory of international relations. For a
general overview on other peace projects during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see also
Malettke, “Europabewußtsein und Europa¨ische Friedenspla¨ne, p. 63–92 and Arcidiacono, Cinq
types de paix.
237 Given the lasting controversy ever since Jean Bodin’s Six Livres de la Re´publique and Samuel
Pufendorf’s analysis of the Holy Roman Empire, it might indeed seem ill-conceived to attempt
to solve the issue of sovereignty among states by reference to the Holy Roman Empire. For fur-
ther discussion of the issue of sovereignty concerning the Holy Roman Empire, see Schro¨der,
“The Constitution of the Holy Roman Empire after 1648”, Schro¨der, “Reich versus Territo-
rien?”, p. 123–143, Asbach, “Die Reichsverfassung als fo¨derativer Staatenbund” and O. Asbach,
“Politik und Frieden beim Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre. Erinnerung an einen (fast) vergessenen Klas-
siker der politischen Philosophie” in Politisches Denken Jahrbuch 1995/96 (Stuttgart 1996), p. 133–
163.
238 See Edwards, Hugo Grotius. The Miracle of Holland, p. 82: ‘there was no law and no obligations
among rulers of states, since there could be no devotion to a common higher good. Further, since
there was no superior human power to impose standards of behavior on individual princes, each
prince remained an authority in his own right – a power above which there was no other. What this
amounted to was an expressed belief that relationships among political states were unrestrainedly
competitive’. Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 252, claims that ‘there is not the slightest evidence
that sovereign states in this century will agree to subordinate themselves to a world government
founded upon consent’.
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proofs, he gave us, as Machiavelli had done ( . . . ) many important
paralogisms’.239
Although in his Projet he does not mention Hobbes’s name, the Abbe´ de
Saint-Pierre drew on his theory of sovereignty to apply Hobbes’s political
philosophy to the sphere of interstate relations. As long as a sovereign arbiter
over the various nations is not implemented, the remedy provided by nat-
ural law necessarily remains deficient. Hobbes maintained that sovereignty
was not applicable to relations between states. For Hobbes, one is there-
fore ‘not to expect such a peace between two nations; because there is no
common power in this world to punish their injustice’.240 The Abbe´ de
Saint-Pierre applied the Hobbesian solution to overcome the consequences
of the state of nature to the international sphere, namely to establish an
arbiter above the anarchical society of states.
At the historical watershed, where the concrete development and
philosophical justification of state authority were emerging in response
to the breakdown of universal Christendom, the Abbe´ perceived the
anarchical society of states as the obstacle to a lasting peace. That relations
between states were similar to the situation of individuals or families in
the state of nature was a commonplace in political theory and practice.
Given that sovereigns of states claimed themselves to be judge in their own
case, all treaties and contracts remained precarious, there being no redress
if any of the contractual parties decided not to honour the contractual
obligations. ‘Sovereigns may give their word, may bind themselves by
mutual promises, sign contracts between themselves; but there is not the
least security that one or the other of the contracting parties will not
change his mind’.241 The lack of mutual trust re-emerges as a central
problem in interstate relations.242 Promises and treaties are only binding
239 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Ouvrages de moral et de politique vol. 6 (Rotterdam 1729–1741), p. 127f.:
‘Hobbes ( . . . ) a plus approche´ de la bonne me´thode de demontrer, mais, faute d’embrasser
tous les principes, au lieu de ve´ritables de´monstrations, il nous a donne´ comme Machiavel ( . . . )
beaucoup de paralogismes en matie`res tre`s importantes’.
240 T. Hobbes, “A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England”
in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury vol. VI, ed. by W. Molesworth (London
1890), p. 7f.
241 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 17: ‘Les Souverains
peuvent se donner des paroles, s’engager par des promesses mutuelles, signer entr’eux des Traitez;
mais il n’y a nulle surete´ suffisante, que l’un ou l’autre des Contracteurs ne changera pas de volonte´’.
242 The importance of trust was analysed and employed equally by the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre in his
other reform projects. In particular as part of his plans for financial reform he put forward the
argument that the crownwould be ill-advised to continue using their brutal and deceitful measures.
Instead, a transparent and well-regulated system should be put in place. This would in turn inspire
‘the confidence that would incline the state’s creditors to lend funds on terms more favorable than
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in the subjective conscience of the contracting party, but they lack an
enforceable obligation in case of non-fulfilment.
The issue for the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre was how to introduce the shift
from a moral requirement to a legally binding framework. This challenge
could only be met if politics were not determined by short-sighted cal-
culations of self-interest that reached no further than a balance of power.
This might represent a realistic response to the de facto situation of inter-
state relations, but failed to provide any structural stability beyond the
contingent outcome of fickle alliances and the fortunes of war. Politics
which skirted around the challenge of providing a framework in which
mutual trust was feasible could not escape the shifting pattern of alliances
and counter-alliance. Self-interest would thus perpetuate mistrust and fear
among states, a regrettable situation that Saint-Pierre attributed to the bal-
ance of power: ‘If the evidence reasoning provides is not sufficient, one
should consult experience, so that one sees what has happened in the last
two hundred years in the system of a balance of power. One may read the
history of Europe. What has this unfortunate system achieved apart from
almost constant wars? How little time did the truce of Vervins243 last? I
could not call with another name than truce this peace which was not able
to last. However, since this truce, how long has the war lasted? Here is the
effect of the balance so much desired by all. Is it not the role of the past to
teach us that with a similar cause we can only expect a future with similar
results? Who does not see that under the system of a balance of power one
only enjoys security with weapons in one’s hand? And therefore, we cannot
enjoy our freedom at the expense of our respite’.244
those which the state presently enjoyed’. Kaiser, “The Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Public Opinion, and
the Reconstitution of the French Monarchy”, p. 631.
243 The Treaty of Vervins was concluded on 13 April 1598 between Philip II and Henry IV – officially
Francewas again at warwith Spain from 1635 onwards, but actually one could argue that Louis XIII’s
nomination of Richelieu as member of the Conseil in 1624 was also the moment France resumed
the war against Spain. See Weber, “Vom verdeckten zum offenen Krieg”, p. 203–217, Parrott,
Richelieu’s Army and for Spain J. H. Elliott, “Foreign Policy and Domestic Crisis: Spain 1598–1659”
in K. Repgen (ed.), Krieg und Politik 1618–1648 (Munich 1988), p. 185–202.
244 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 38f.: ‘Si l’evidence
du raisonnement ne suffit pas, que l’on consulte l’expe´rience, que l’on voye ce qui est arrive´ depuis
deux cens ans dans le Systeˆme de l’Equilibre, qu’on lise l’histoire de l’Europe? Qu’est-ce qu’a opere´
ce malheureux Systeˆme, sinon des Guerres presque perpe´tuelles? Combien peu a dure´ la Tre´ve de
Vervins? Je ne sc¸aurois appeller d’un autre nom un Paix qui ne peut pas durer. Combien de tems au
contraire a dure´ la Guerre depuis la fin de cette Tre´ve jusqu’a` present? Tel est l’effet de cet Equilibre
si desire´. Or le passe´ ne nous instruit-il pas que d’une cause semblable, on ne doit attendre pour
l’avenir que de semblables effets? Et qui ne voit pas que dans le Syste´me de l’Equilibre on ne trouve
de suˆrete´ que les armes a` la main? Et qu’ainsi l’on ne peut jamais jouir de sa liberte´, qu’aux de´c¸ens
de son repos’.
Saint-Pierre’s Project for Peace and his Challenge 187
The Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre addressed two levels of argument throughout
his Projet. He was keen to demonstrate that right reasoning would lead
everybody to the same conclusions he drew himself. He presented his
method as being in the tradition of Descartes and maintained that human
reason was the critical judge of the validity of any intellectual undertaking.
But, as he implies in the above citation, some people may not be used to
abstract reasoning, or think it not sufficient proof in the realm of politics.
When these people refer to experience, they too will be drawn to his
conclusions. In recalling that the period between 1598 and 1713 was not one
of peace and stability, the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre is stressing the difference
between a temporary truce and an enduring peace treaty. The latter is, of
course, meant to end the hostilities for good. But it is the notion of a truce,
not peace, that characterises a balance of power.245
The Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre denounced the balance of power as nothing
more than an improvised system246 which tried, in his view entirely in
vain, to address the underlying structural contradictions of the anarchical
society of sovereign states.247 He was more sceptical about this system and
its underlying principle of a balance of power than many of his contem-
poraries. What was necessary, according to the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, was
the rule of law. Only this would provide stability and reliability, which
would in turn make mutual trust possible. But the rule of law among states
was, analogous to the state of nature, only possible if states gave up the
unrestricted rights of their sovereignty.248
The problem was that ‘the present constitution of Europe would
never bring about anything other than almost permanent wars because
it was unable to provide sufficient security for the execution of
245 As we saw in Chapter 4.1, Leibniz had made a very similar point before him.
246 Heinz Duchhardt stressed the importance of the notion of a state system. He perceived such a
system as interwoven by cultural, economic and political links which were not intended to destroy
other states but were meant to last and to provide a structural basis for the relations between states.
Duchhardt, “Das Reich in der Mitte des Staatensystems”, p. 2.
247 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 47: ‘Or quand
les Alliez seroient parvenus a` former une e´galite´, un Equilibre entre deux Souverainetez, quel
moyen peuvent-ils jamais avoir pour rendre e´gaux les ge´nies des Souverains qui doivent dans la
suite gouverner ces Etats e´gaux? Cependant sans ce moyen qui est impossible, n’est-il pas aussi
impossible qu’ils ayent jamais aucune suˆrete´ de conserver cet Equilibre seulement pendant un
demi-sie`cle? Or jusqu’a` quand se´duits par de vaines apparences prendront-ils pour une re´alite´
spe´cieuse une chime`re qui leur couˆte de´ja` tant d’hommes & tant de richesses, & qui leur en doit
encore tant couˆter’.
248 Every conflict demonstrated that each party believed it had right on its side. They were the only
judge in the conflict. Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. III,
p. 7: ‘Je suis Juge ( . . . ) & seul Juge dans ma propre Cause, & dans toutes mes pre´tentions, je ne
reconnois aucun Superieur sur la Terre’.
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treaties’.249 According to the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, this unstable situa-
tion had to be overcome in order to ensure that the conflicting parties were
to have ‘another rule than the will of the sovereign princes, that is to say the
rule of law’.250 In reference to Hobbes, the Abbe´ reiterated almost expressis
verbis the Hobbesian description of the state of nature: ‘I reflected upon
the sad life of the savages. In truth they do not depend on any sovereign,
any law or society; but because of the necessities of life they are extremely
dependent on the seasons. They are even dependent on ferocious animals
and what is most terrible about their dependence is that they also depend
on their neighbours who are no different from the ferocious animals and
who could at any time take their possessions and even their lives without
punishment. ( . . . ) It is all very well that they make mutual promises in
order to enjoy their possessions in peace, they have no security whatsoever
that they will be kept. ( . . . ) Who would be so eccentric as to prefer the life
of the savages, with its independence of all laws coupled with its hard and
perpetual dependence of each on the other, to the life that we enjoy of per-
fect independence from others, coupled with our dependence on laws?’251
The state of nature scenario serves once more to evoke the consequences
when no legal legitimate framework safeguards human society. Without
the rule of law there will be no security which would allow states to trust
in the keeping of promises and contracts.
Drawing the same conclusion as Hobbes reached for individuals in the
state of nature, Saint-Pierre envisaged an arbiter endowed with sufficient
power to enforce agreement between states, which would be in the interest
of every state concerned, because it would not only overcome the fragilities
of a balance of power but also enhance commerce and industry: ‘They
249 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 3: ‘la constitution
pre´sente de l’Europe ne sc¸auroit jamais produire que des Guerres presque continuelles, parce
qu’elle ne sc¸auroit jamais procurer aucune suˆrete´ suffisante de l’execution des Traitez’.
250 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 13: ‘une autre Regle
que leur volonte´, c’est la Loy’.
251 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. II, p. 360–363: ‘J’ai fait
faire re´flexion sur la vie malheureuse des Sauvages. Ils ne de´pendent a` la ve´rite´ d’aucun Souverain,
d’aucun Loix, d’aucune Socie´te´, mais a` cause des ne´cessitez de la vie, ils de´pendent extre´mement
des Saison; ils de´pendent meˆme des beˆtes fe´roces, & ce qui est le plus terrible dans leur de´pendance,
ils de´pendent de leurs voisins qui sont autant de beˆtes fe´roces qui peuvent tous les jours leur oˆter
impune´ment leurs biens & la vie meˆme. ( . . . ) ils ont beau de faire des promesses re´ciproques
pour jouir en Paix de leurs possessions, ils n’ont nulle surete´ de leur e´xe´cution ( . . . ) Qui seroit
assez extravagant pour pre´fe´rer la vie des Sauvages, avec leur inde´pendence de toutes Loix, jointe a`
la dure & perpe´tuelle de´pendance les uns aux autres, a` la vie que nous menons dans une parfaite
inde´pendance les uns des autres, jointe a` notre de´pendance des Loix?’ Compare Chapter 3.2.
The well-known description of the state of nature also quoted earlier is to be found in Hobbes,
Leviathan, Chapter XIII, p. 89.
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are not facilitated by arts or commerce, because they have no laws, nor a
permanent society which can punish those who break the laws’.252 Like in
Hobbes’s political society, the interstate order that Saint-Pierre envisaged
is not an arbitrary social gathering of people, but the legal framework of
a political body, established and thus legitimised by contract, and backed
by an enforceable law.253 As to an arbiter of this system of European states
under the rule of law, the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre envisaged a EuropeanUnion
or federation with representative institutions in the form of a permanent
congress and a law court. The arbiter was, therefore, not conceptualised as
a single person or individual sovereign.
Unlike a social contract between individuals, however, the envisaged
contract for establishing a society between the European states had to be
installed to be effective.254 For the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, it was crucial
to convince the European sovereigns to join together in such a contract.
Hence his endeavour to demonstrate that it was not only in the interest
of each state, but that such a society was at the same time a practicable
solution to the endemic conflicts between the states. Nevertheless: ‘It is
absolutely necessary that everyone remains in possession of what he cur-
rently enjoys’.255 Saint-Pierre grasped that preservation of the liberty and
independence of the different states was a precondition and the goal of the
contract: ‘It is absolutely necessary for the preservation of their lives, their
goods, their freedoms and their rights, that they agree in their protestation
that no one will claim to be judge of his own cause’.256 Being judge in
252 See Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. II, p. 360: ‘Ils
n’ont point le se´cours des Arts & du Commerce, parce qu’ils n’ont point de Loix, ni de Socie´te´
permanente qui puissent punir les infracteurs de Loix’.
253 As a matter of fact, and still in close analogy with Hobbes’s argument, only under the legal
framework which was endowed with an arbiter would the notion of property be meaningful. Abbe´
de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. III, p. 78: ‘Dans l’Arbitrage
chacun est sur de conserver les biens qu’il possede, & ceux qu’il pourra acquerir par son industrie,
[ou] par son travail ( . . . ). L’Arbitrage ne peut point lui oˆter rien de ses biens, parce que l’Arbitrage
est e´tabli pour conserver tranquillement chacun dans ses biens, & pour empe`cher les invasions
re´ciproques. L’Arbitrage est une convention faite pour l’inte´reˆt de chacun des Associez: Or, un
point important pour l’inte´reˆt commun; c’est que chacun puisse avoir une veritable propriete´ de
ses biens’.
254 That is to say, whereas the contractual foundation of the particular states was only a hypothesis
which allowed for the consideration of the relation and, as for instance in the case of Locke,
separation of powers, the reference to a foundational contract for the Union Europe´enne had de
facto to be realised.
255 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre,Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. III, p. 50: ‘Il est absolument
necessaire que ( . . . ) chacun d’eux demeura en possession de ce qu’il possede actuellement’.
256 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. III, p. 51: ‘Il est absolument
necessaire pour la conversation de leur vie, de leurs biens, de leur liberte´ de leurs droits, qu’ils
conviennent que dans leurs contestation nul ne pre´tendra eˆtre Juge legitime dans sa prope cause’.
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one’s own case (ipse judex) was the distinguishing character of the state of
nature.
What remained was to define an institutional organisation to guarantee
the security of a society based on law. ‘It is absolutely necessary that they
[the states] agree to provide sufficient means to give arbitration sufficient
strength to execute the general laws and particular judgements. The sword
is no less necessary for justice, than the scales, laws and judgements ( . . . )
which would be useless if arbitration had not the power to execute them.
We have to make sure that no one could be tempted to resist the force
of arbitration’.257 The challenging task was, on the one hand, to establish
an arbiter empowered with sufficient authority and adequate powers of
coercion and, on the other hand, to ensure that such an arbiter would not
misuse his coercive power and thus threaten the rights and liberty of the
contracting states. A federative structure of states was the Abbe´’s answer to
this challenge. A political body based on federative principles would allow
for the establishment of a sufficiently strong arbiter but still respect the
rights and liberties of the contracting parties.258
Initially, the Abbe´ chose the federative structure of the Swiss, Dutch
and German states as an appropriate example for the European union of
states: ‘I found that if the ( . . . ) Sovereigns of Europe in order to preserve
their role in the current government, to avoid war between them and to
gain all the advantages of perpetual trade from nation to nation, wanted
to conclude a treaty of union and a perpetual congress, more or less on the
257 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre,Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. III, p. 56: ‘Il est absolument
necessaire qu’ils conviennent de moyens suffisans pour donner a` l’Arbitrage une force suffisante
pour faire execute les Loix generales, & ses Jugemens particuliers. L’epe´e n’est pas moins necessaire
a` la Justice que la balance, les Loix, les Jugemens ( . . . ) seroient inutiles si l’Arbitrage n’avoit pas la
force de les faire executer; il faut absolument faire en sorte que nul ne puisse eˆtre tente´ de re´sister
a` la force de l’Arbitrage’.
258 See especially Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. III,
p. 117. Political theory which advocated a federal republic was far from widespread in France.
Apart from the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, a few other political thinkers, notably Mably, Montesquieu
and Rousseau, later developed similar ideas, and they all seem to have been influenced by the
Abbe´’s writings. See H. Hintze, Staatseinheit und Fo¨deralismus im alten Frankreich und in der
Revolution (Frankfurt 1989), p. 69f, O. Asbach, “Staat, Politik und die Verfassung der Freiheit. Zu
den Anfa¨ngen des republikanischen Verfassungsdenkens in der franzo¨sischen Aufkla¨rung” in Der
Staat 42 (2003), p. 1–34, J. K. Wright, “The Idea of a Republican Constitution in Old Re´gime
France” in Republicanism a Shared European Heritage vol. I, ed. by M. v. Gelderen and Q. Skinner
(Cambridge 2002), p. 289–306, M. Sonenscher, “Republicanism, State Finance and the Emergence
of Commercial Society in Eighteenth Century France – or from Royal to Ancient Republicanism
and Back” in Republicanism a Shared European Heritage vol. II, ed. by M. v. Gelderen and Q.
Skinner (Cambridge 2002), p. 275–291, J. K. Wright, A Classical Republican in Eighteenth Century
France. The Political Thought of Mably (Stanford 1997) and P. Schro¨der, “‘Une distinction frivole’ –
Enlightenment Discussions of Citizenship” in Athenian Legacies. European Debates on Citizenship,
ed. by P. M Kitromelides (Florence 2014), p. 255–269.
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same model of the seven sovereignties of the Netherlands, or the thirteen
sovereignties of Switzerland, or the sovereignties of Germany and to create
the European Union based on what is good about these Unions, especially
the Germanic Union which is composed of two hundred sovereignties
( . . . ) so that the weakest would have enough security, the most powerful
would not be able to ruin the others, and everyone would keep their
reciprocal promises exactly’.259 We ought to pause here for a moment.
The enumerated advantages of such a union with a coercive power for
arbitration at its disposal are first and foremost the avoidance of war,
followed by trade, enjoyment of the political privileges of the sovereign
states, the security of even the smaller members of such a union and the
trustworthiness of given promises. The notion of trust enjoys a status in
this concept that is not to be overlooked. It is of equal importance with
the other prima facie more tangible benefits and values listed.
The Holy Roman Empire was the prime example for the Abbe´’s union
of European states. Reference to the Swiss or Dutch Republics had long
been commonplace in political thought260, but selecting the Holy Roman
Empire as the key example for his own Projet was more unusual: ‘In
examining the government of the sovereign states of Germany, I did not
encounter more difficulties in creating this European Union for our time,
than they [videlicet the German sovereigns] did previously when they
created the Germanic Union, to execute on a larger scale what had already
been created on a smaller’.261 What he saw in the Holy Roman Empire
was an elaborate division of power institutionalised in its various political
establishments and procedural customs. The Holy Roman Empire served
as the best example by virtue of the fact that it successfully accommodated
a range of very different political units. Greater and smaller states could
259 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. I Preface, p. VII: ‘Je
trouvai que si les ( . . . ) Souverainetez d’E´urope pour se conserver dans le Gouvernement pre´sent,
pour e´viter la Guerre entre elle, & pour se procurer tous les avantages d’un Commerce perpe´tuel
de Nations a` Nation, vouloient faire un Traite´ d’Union & un Congrez perpe´tuel a` peu pres sur le
meˆme modelle des sept Souverainte´s de Hollande, ou des treize Souverainte´s des Suisses, ou des
Souverainte´s d’Allemagne, & former l’Union Europe´enne sur ce qu’il y a de bon dans ces Unions
& sur tout dans l’Union Germanique compose´e de plus de deux cens Souverainte´s, ( . . . ) que les
plus foibles auroient surete´ suffisante, que la grande puissance des plus forts ne pourroit leur nuire,
que chacun garderoit exactement les promesses re´ciproques’.
260 See Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555–1590, Israel, The Dutch Republic and
T. Maissen, Die Geburt der Republik. Staatsversta¨ndnis und Repra¨sentation in der fru¨hneuzeitlichen
Eidgenossenschaft (Go¨ttingen 2006).
261 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. I Preface, p. VIIIf.: ‘En
examinant le Gouvernement des Souverains d’Allemagne, je ne trouvai pas plus de difficultez a`
former des nos jours le Corps Europe´en, qu’on en trouva autrefois a` former le Corps Germanique, a`
exe´cuter en plus grand ce qui e´toit de´ja` exe´cuter en moins grand’.
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form a political body because the Empire operated a wide range of
institutions.
But a question remains. After giving a historical account of the Holy
Roman Empire from the time of Charles the Great, and of the later
competitive relationship between the estates and the emperor resulting
in the eventual establishment of a federal structure, the Abbe´ de Saint-
Pierre advances the claim that such a federation had been founded by
commitment to a treaty and that such a treaty rested on the theoretical
work of a ‘wise author of the Germanic union’262 who had sketched such
a union as a project.263 Why, one has to wonder, did the Abbe´ introduce
this myth?264 Especially since the Holy Roman Empire was intended to
play a crucial role in the Abbe´’s argument for the practicability of such a
foundational contract and its ensuing functioning political institutions for
Europe. This whole idea of a founding contract for the federation of the
Holy Roman Empire on the basis of a previous project becomes even more
puzzling when the Abbe´ asserts: ‘I do not know if this project was first the
idea of a prince or of an individual. I do not know either who contributed
to its creation, but still the Union was to be established. It was not created
without a project and it was in that time that this political masterpiece
appeared, worthy of a good prince or a good citizen, and which had been
so necessary for the salvation of the country’.265 Among many of the Abbe´’s
critics was Leibniz, who criticised him exactly because of this conception.
‘It seems’, Leibniz argues, ‘that he conceives the German union as having
begun with some treaty; but this cannot be reconciled with history’.266
Though lacking the historical facts regarding the foundation of the
Holy Roman Empire, the Abbe´ was nevertheless keen to demonstrate that
262 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 56: ‘sage Auteur
de l’Union Germanique’. See also Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en
Europe vol. I, p. 67.
263 For an extensive discussion of this puzzle, see Asbach, Die Za¨hmung der Leviathane, p. 136–156.
Compare, apart from the already cited references, notably Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre
la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 118, where he speaks of a ‘Solon Alleman’.
264 Patrick Riley dismissed the whole of Saint-Pierre’s discussion of the Holy Roman Empire as ‘pure
fantasy’. P. Riley, “The Abbe´ de St. Pierre and Voltaire on Perpetual Peace in Europe” in World
Affairs 137 (1974–1975), p. 188. However, such an assertion does not do justice to the Abbe´ de
Saint-Pierre’s proposal and the conceptual significance of the Holy Roman Empire in his theory.
265 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 68: ‘Je ne scai pas
si ce Projet tomba d’abord dans l’esprit d’un Prince ou d’un Partiqulier. Je ne scai pas non plus
jusqu’ou` l’Auteur le porta d’abord, mais touˆjours ce fut alors que l’Union commenc¸a a` se former,
elle ne se forma pas sans Projet, & ce fut dans ce tems-la` que parut ce chef-d’œuvre de politique
si digne d’un bon Prince, d’un bon Citoyen, & qui e´toit si necessaire au salut de sa Patrie’.
266 G. W. Leibniz, “Observations on the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre’s ‘Project for Perpetual Peace’” in
G. W. Leibniz’ Political Writings, ed. by P. Riley (Cambridge 1988), p. 182.
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its existing institutions could serve as a model for his envisaged union
of European states.267 He knew, however, that the institutional structure
of the Holy Roman Empire was less than straightforward. Criticising the
emperor for undermining the federative union of the Holy Roman Empire,
the Abbe´ found the tension between the emperor and the estates to have
jeopardised the project of a federative republic.268 It was because of ‘this old
monarchical construction [that it was so difficult] to form all those states
into one republican state like the Germanic one’.269 Leibniz maintained
the opposite view: ‘The defect of the Empire is not, as M. l’Abbe´ de Saint-
Pierre seems to take it, that the Emperor has too much power, but that the
Emperor, as Emperor, does not have enough’.270 But the Abbe´ de Saint-
Pierre’s commitment was to establish a federative union on republican
principles that would overcome the structural problems of the anarchical
and precarious society of European states.
In the Abbe´’s account of the Empire, the Diet and the imperial law
chamber, theReichskammergericht, mutually endorsed and incorporated the
federative structure, these two institutions guaranteed the representation
of all the members in the Diet and served as arbiter for disputes within the
federation. Also crucial was the system of the imperial circles (Reichskreise)
providing for an even distribution of power within the union. However,
this republican structure was threatened by the emperor: ‘The weakening
of the freedom of the Germanic Union becomes even more evident if
we consider the state in which the authority of the Imperial Chamber
is currently found. ( . . . ) It was, so to speak, the centre of the Union
( . . . ). The authority of this Chamber combined with the authority of
the Diet ( . . . ) made up all the strength of the Union, it was in the
267 It is this strategy which might help to explain the ambivalent and confusing references to the
history of the Holy Roman Empire.
268 On the use of republicanism by the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre see Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Discours sur
la Polysynodie (Amsterdam 1719), p. 71 and 122f., Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix
perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 275f. See also O. Asbach, Staat und Politik zwischen Absolutismus
und Aufkla¨rung. Der Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre und die Herausbildung der franzo¨sischen Aufkla¨rung bis
zur Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts (Hildesheim 2005), esp. p. 109–137, Asbach, “Staat, Politik und die
Verfassung der Freiheit” and Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbe´ de Saint-
Pierre, p. 108. Note, however, that Kaiser, “The Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Public Opinion, and the
Reconstitution of the French Monarchy”, p. 633 sees the Abbe´ as a ‘royalist’.
269 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 85: ‘ce vieux
e´difice Monarchique, [that it was so difficult/bien difficile] de faire de tout ces Etats un Etat plus
Republicain, que celui de Corps Germanique’.
270 Leibniz, “Observations on the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre’s ‘Project for Perpetual Peace’”, p. 182. This
confirms Leibniz’s patriotic attitude towards the Empire (Reichspatriotismus) as discussed in
Chapter 4.1.
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Emperor’s interests to weaken them’.271 The conflict of interests between
the emperor and the estates was a commonplace topic of debate in the Holy
Roman Empire and in France alike.272 Bypassing the intractable question
of where sovereignty could be found in the Holy Roman Empire, the
Abbe´’s emphasis was on the original structure and foundation of the Holy
Roman Empire, conceived as a republican federation that endured in the
form of the imperial institutions. Regrettably the Emperor had usurped the
sovereignty previously enshrined in the institutions: ‘The Emperor became
( . . . ) the unique judge of the differences between the other sovereigns;
therefore we can say that this single defect led irresistibly towards the ruin
of the German Republic’.273
At least the notion of a founding project for the Holy Roman Empire
allowed the Abbe´ a point of reference that transcended the imperfect
actuality of the Holy Roman Empire. In this he was different from
Rousseau, who admired the existing Holy Roman Empire as decisive in
preserving the balance of power in Europe: ‘Despite the negative aspects of
the constitution of the Empire’, Rousseau claims, ‘it is certain that as long
as it lasts, the balance of Europe will never be broken, no potentate will
have to fear being dethroned by another, and the Treaty of Westphalia will
have a good chance to remain the foundation of our political system’.274
Whereas Rousseau argued as a historian or politician referring to evident
facts and their concrete implications, the Abbe´’s intention had been very
different. ‘Rousseau’, as rightly argued by Sven Stelling-Michaud, ‘has
here deformed the thought of the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre’.275 The Abbe´ was
271 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre,Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 80f.: ‘L’affoiblissement
de la liberte´ du Corps Germanique est encore devenu fort sensible par l’e´tat ou` se trouve presen-
tement l’autorite´ de la Chambre Imperiale ( . . . ). C’e´toit, pour ainsi dire, le centre de l’Union.
( . . . ) L’autorite´ de cette Chambre jointe avec l’autorite´ de la Diette ( . . . ) faisoient toute la force
de l’Union; il e´toit l’intereˆt des Empereurs de les affoiblir’.
272 See Malettke, Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, esp. p. 129–261.
273 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpe´tuelle en Europe vol. I, p. 81f.: ‘l’Empereur
devient ( . . . ) l’unique Juge des differens des autres Souverains; ainsi on peut dire que ce seul
de´faut a` conduit insessiblement la Republique Germanique sur le penchant de sa ruine’.
274 J.-J. Rousseau, “Extrait du Projet de Paix Perpe´tuelle de Monsieur l’Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre” in
Œuvres comple`tes vol. III (Paris 1964), p. 572: ‘Malgre´ les de´fauts de cette constitution de l’Empire’,
Rousseau claims, ‘il est certain que tant qu’elle subsistera, jamais l’e´quilibre de l’Europe ne sera
rompu, qu’aucun Potentat n’aura a` craindre d’eˆtre de´troˆne´ par un autre, et que le Traite´ de
Westphalie sera peut-eˆtre a` jamais parmis nous la base du syste´me politique’. However, Rousseau
is generally very critical of the balance-of-power thinking. He is thus somewhat distorting the
Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre’s view, rather than making a genuine argument for the balance of power. See
Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, p. 104.
275 S. Stelling Michaud, “Notes et Variantes” in J.-J. Rousseau, Œuvres comple`tes vol. III (Paris 1964),
p. 1546: ‘Rousseau de´forme ici la pense´e de l’abbe´ de Saint-Pierre’. The historical context helps us
to understand Rousseau’s treatment of the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre. Madame Dupin, at whose salon
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much more daring than Rousseau gave him credit for. Rousseau warned
that such a plan was ‘too good to be adopted’ and any attempt to realise it
would demand ‘violent means, which are unacceptable for humanity’.276
A republican constitution for the European sovereign states was the
political aim. But since experience showed that on the interstate level
one was ill-advised to trust entirely the goodwill of sovereigns, the Abbe´
recognised that to realise his project for perpetual peace might call for
a virtuous lawgiver, if one could be found. In the third volume of his
project he observed that the essence of his programme had ‘previously
been proposed by Henry the Great, king of France’.277 It is telling that
the Abbe´ changed the title of his project after Louis XIV’s death on 1
September 1715.278 In the first two volumes of the Projet published in 1713,
the Abbe´ addressed only the reader in his preface and avoided reference
to Louis XIV, but after Louis’s death he addressed the regent, Philippe
d’Orle´ans (1674–1723), in the third volume.279 It is clear why he avoided
addressing Louis XIV directly. As we have seen earlier, when considering
the criticism Fe´nelon mounted against Louis XIV, the Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre
the young Rousseau had met the ageing Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre in 1741 for the first time, asked the
Abbe´ de Mably to suggest to Rousseau that he should rework the political writings of the Abbe´ de
Saint-Pierre. The result was the above-mentioned Extrait. Mably even more than Rousseau still
treated interstate relations as nothing more than a chain of alliances and counter-alliances, wars
and the peace treaties which followed them. Even the title Le Droit public de l’Europe. Fonde´ sur
les Traitez conclus jusqu’en l’anne´e 1740 suggests that interstate relations are founded on treaties
between sovereign states, but nothing is said about their validity and their inherent philosophical
and practical problems, such as the ipse judex principle. See Drouet, L’abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, p. 331.
Rousseau gives an account of these events in book 9 of his Confessions. J.-J. Rousseau, The
Confessions, ed. by J. M. Cohen (London 1953), p. 379f. On the intellectual relationship between
Rousseau and Mably, see Schro¨der, “‘Une distinction frivole’ – Enlightenment Discussions of
Citizenship” as well as the still invaluable studies by R. Derathe´, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la Science
Politique de son Temps (Paris 1995) andWright, A Classical Republican in Eighteenth Century France.
See also the preface to Leibniz’s collection of international treaties (Codex Iuris Gentium, 1693),
where he claims that the basis of international law is enshrined in international treaties. G. W.
Leibniz, “Codex Iuris Gentium (Praefatio)” in G. W. Leibniz’ Political Writings, ed. by P. Riley
(Cambridge 1988), p. 170.
276 J.-J. Rousseau, “Jugement sur le Projet de Paix Perpe´tuelle” inŒuvres comple`tes vol. III (Paris 1964),
p. 599: ‘trop bon pour eˆtre adopte´’, and p. 600: ‘des moyens violens et redoubtables a` l’humanite´’.
277 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet de Traite´, p. 1: ‘propose´ autre fois par Henry le Grand Roy de France’.
278 On the death of Louis XIV, see Bluche, Louis XIV, p. 879–899. Bluche’s study occasionally comes
close to hagiography. Much more critical – and interesting – is Voltaire, The Age of Louis XIV.
279 In his will Louis XIV had declared that Philippe d’Orle´ans, who was a member of the royal family
of France, should serve as Regent of the Kingdom until Louis XV (1710–1774) would be of age
in 1723. The first eight years of Louis XV’s official rule were politically unstable. Louis XIV’s
testament stipulated that the kingdom was to be governed by a Regency Council made up of
fourteen members. The Duke of Orle´ans had only limited powers as president of the council as
all decisions were to be taken by majority vote. See J. Shennan, Philippe, Duke of Orle´ans. Regent
of France, 1715–23 (London 1979).
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was not the only French intellectual disappointed by the way his king used
his power. But now, with the death of Louis XIV, the Abbe´ believed that
the regent and perhaps future king, Louis XV, might make better use
of his proposals.280 The reference to Henry IV appeared in the address:
‘To the regent, Sir, after having given in the third volume the remaining
explanations which seemed necessary to demonstrate the importance and
solidity of the famous project of Henry the Great, your ancestor; I thought
that I should not dispense with offering your royal highness the entire
work’.281 A single sovereign282, it seems, might have the power to help
realise a republican project of a European union. At issue for French foreign
policy was a stable constitutional framework which would allow for peace
and in turn foster free trade and the economic advantages flowing from it.
The Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre merits recognition as a political thinker who
questioned certain consequences of the formation of the modern state at a
timewhen this process was at its height. Though not the only writing which
accompanied the negotiations at Utrecht283, the Abbe´’s Projet represents
280 See also Kaiser, “The Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Public Opinion, and the Reconstitution of the French
Monarchy”, esp. p. 630. Kaiser reconstructs Saint-Pierre’s other reform plans in view of the
shortcomings and failures of the French monarchy under Louis XIV. J. Klaits, Printed Propaganda
under Louis XIV: Absolute Monarchy and Public Opinion (Princeton 1976) and L. Rothkrug,
Opposition to Louis XIV – The Political and Social Origins of the French Enlightenment (Princeton
1965) are both still invaluable for the wider context. The best modern study on the Abbe´ de
Saint-Pierre and his projects during the regency is Asbach, Staat und Politik zwischen Absolutismus
und Aufkla¨rung, esp. p. 139–189.
281 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Projet de Traite´, p. III: ‘AU REGENT. Monseigneur, Apre´s avoir donne´
dans ce troisie´me Tome le reste des e´claircissemens qui paroissent necessaires pour de´montrer
l’importance & la solidite´ du fameux Projet du Roi Henri le Grand voˆtre Bsayeul, j’ai cru que je
ne pouvois me dispenser d’offrir l’Ouvrage entier a` VOˆTRE ALTESSE ROYALE’.
282 It is quite telling that even in the twentieth century political thinkers are readily prepared to rely
heavily on the idea of individual political leadership. The most important example is, presumably,
John Rawls when he somewhat surprisingly introduced the statesman as a crucial link in his
international political theory. J. Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard 1999), p. 97: ‘It is the task of
the student of philosophy to articulate and express the permanent conditions and the real interests
of a well-ordered society. It is the task of the statesman, however, to discern these conditions and
interests in practice. The statesman sees deeper and further than most others and grasps what needs
to be done. The statesman must get it right, or nearly so, and then hold fast from this vantage’.
283 See also the contemporary account C. Freschot, The compleat History of the Peace of Utrecht
as also that of Gertruydenberg: Containing All the Acts, Memorials, Representations, Complaints,
Demands, Letters, Speeches, Treaties and other Authentick Pieces relating to the Negotiations there, 2
vols. (London 1715). Freschot mentioned the English interest in establishing a balance of power,
which reiterates the position which we have already seen in the early seventeenth century. One
month before the treaty with Spain was signed at Utrecht, Queen Anne asserted in a speech to
parliament that : ‘the present Opportunity would be irreconverably lost, of Britain’s Establishing
a real Balance of Power in Europe, and Improving our Commerce’. Freschot, The compleat History
of the Peace of Utrecht vol. I, p. 110. Britain’s long-standing pursuit of establishing a balance of
power was eventually achieved, which meant that Britain could now claim to defend the balance
of power. Not surprisingly the balance of power became an increasingly polemical term in the
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a thorough analysis of the interstate system. Contemporary concern was
raised regarding the trustworthiness of Louis XIV and thus the reliability
of the Utrecht peace settlement. Christoph Ziegler suggested in the subtitle
of his Umsta¨ndliches Friedens-Diarium that French negotiations for peace
were conducted with fraudulent intent.284
The treaties concluded at Utrecht expressly based the European state
system and assurance of peace on the idea of a balance of power285: ‘But
whereas the war which is so happily ended by this peace, was at the begin-
ning undertaken, and was carried on for so many years with the utmost
force, at immense charge, and with almost infinite slaughter, because of the
great danger which threatened the liberty and safety of all Europe, from the
too close conjunction of the kingdoms of Spain and France. And whereas to
take away all uneasiness and suspicion, concerning such conjunction, out
of the minds of people, and to settle and establish the peace and tranquility
of Christendom by an equal balance of power (which is the best and most
solid foundation of a mutual friendship, and of a concord which will be
lasting on all sides) as well the Catholic King as the Most Christian King
have consented, that care should be taken by sufficient precautions, that
the kingdoms of Spain and France should never come and be united under
the same dominion’.286 That the European powers remained suspicious of
each other is confirmed by the idea that a balance of power would be the
best and most solid foundation of a mutual friendship. Mistrust and lack
eighteenth century. See in particular J. H. G. v. Justi, Die Chima¨re des Gleichgewichts von Europa
(Altona 1758). See also Kaeber, Die Idee des europa¨ischen Gleichgewichts and Strohmeyer, Theorie
der Interaktion.
284 The full title reads:Umsta¨ndliches Friedens-Diarium, worinnen anfa¨nglich alle die jenige von Frank-
reich Zeit gegenwa¨rtig blutig gefu¨hrten Krieg arglistig gesuchte Friedenshandlungen bis auff die erste
Conferenz inclusive, vorgestellet: Dann was von Tag zu Tag auf annoch wa¨hrendem Friedens-Congress
passieret; und viel andere merckwu¨rdige Begebenheiten und zu dieser Materie geho¨rige Documentten,
Brieffschafften u. mehr zu finden und anzutreffen (Frankfurt am Main 1712). An excellent account
on the war of the Spanish succession, including the various conflicts and struggles for hegemony
outside Europe, is Bernardo Ares, Luis XIV Rey de Espanˇa. Still valuable is also Gerard, The Peace
of Utrecht.
285 See also the general assessment in Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, p. 177: ‘The treaties of
Utrecht (1713) still referred to the Respublica Christiana, though they were the last treaties to do so.
They were also the first to declare that they were made in order to preserve the European balance
of power’.
286 G. Chalmers, A Collection of Treaties between Great Britain and other Powers vol. II (London 1790),
p. 43, see also p. 71. References to the balance of power were made in the treaty between Spain
and Great Britain and in the treaty between Spain and Savoy. See also the studies by M. Braubach,
“Die Friedensverhandlungen in Utrecht und Rastadt 1712–1714” inHistorisches Jahrbuch 90 (1970),
p. 284–298 and H. Duchhardt, “The Missing Balance” in Journal of the History of International
Law 2 (2000), p. 67–72.
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of institutional mechanisms to mediate conflicts remained intrinsic to this
system.
The Abbe´’s alternative programme addressed the issue of trust as well
as the shortcomings of the balance of power. In his Annales politiques,
published shortly after his death, he summarised again in five ‘fundamental
articles for a European Diet’287 the stipulations to which all European
sovereigns needed to subscribe.Only by establishing a permanent federative
representation of all European states, endowed with power of arbitration
to resolve any ensuing conflicts, would enduring security for all states be
possible.288 This remained the essential alternative to the anarchical society
of independent sovereign states and their unstable balance of power. A
reoccurring objection to the idea of a federative association as an effective
institutionalised framework guaranteeing peace was that it impinged on
the prerogatives of (princely) state sovereignty, ‘a Thing’ as William Penn
put it in his Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe ‘they will
never endure’.289 But as Penn and others like Cruce´ or the Abbe´ de Saint-
Pierre, who advanced some such framework were eager to demonstrate, this
objection was ‘aMistake, for they [the sovereign states] remain as Soveraign
at Home as ever they were. Neither their Power over their People, nor the
usual revenue they pay them, is diminished ( . . . ). So that the Soveraignties
are as they were, for none of them have now any Soveraignty over one
another: And if this be called a lessening of their Power, it must be only
because the great Fish can no longer eat up the little ones290, and that each
Soveraignty is equally defended from Injuries, and disabled from committing
them’.291
The concept of trust had emerged in the international political thought
of the seventeenth century as a key component in alternative conceptu-
alisations of interstate relations. But on its own it remained too feeble to
ground and enforce an interstate order of peace. According to the Abbe´ de
Saint-Pierre, trust needed to be re-enforced by legitimate power. This was
only possible on the basis of a delegation of sovereignty on the international
level in the form of a republican federation of the sovereign states.
287 Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Annales Politiques vol. I (London 1757), p. 54: ‘Articles fondamentaux de la
Diete Europe´ane’.
288 See Abbe´ de Saint-Pierre, Annales Politiques vol. I, p. 54–59.
289 Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 412.
290 Baruch de Spinoza had already made this point. Cf. B. Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise, ed.
by M. D. Yale (Newburyport 2004), p. 179.
291 Penn, “An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe”, p. 412.
